After detailed analysis, the conclusion is that Japan should be responsible for the obligation of immediate notification and since Japan unilaterally discharge the wastes without prior specific permits of other contracting countries, it should also be responsible for the violation of prevention of dumping. Since so far, no material injury has emerged and there would appear to be no culpability as regards the prevention of transboundary harm. Finally, this paper stresses the necessity to develop a worldwide agreement concerning the liability for transboundary harm and to establish an institutional framework for the enforcement of a state’s obligations, and also the great significance of international cooperation between nations and organisations in relation to marine environmental protection.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2012.01.038

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[RIO DE JANEIRO] Brazil’s Paiter Suruí community has become the first indigenous group in the country to receive international certification to sell carbon credits in return for protecting and restoring forests in their Amazonian territory.The Suruí community, which numbers around 1300 people, was first contacted by outsiders in 1968. Over the past decade, with assistance from environmental advocates, they have conducted a sophisticated campaign to prove to the world that they are helping to preserve their 248,000 hectare forest territory.Four years ago, they established the Suruí Forest Carbon Project, with a view to selling carbon credits under the so-called REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) mechanism.

Indigenous Brazilian group certified to trade carbon credits – SciDev.Net

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It is shown that without binding commitments for Developing Countries, the warming target of 2 °C will be exceeded with a probability above 50%, even if Annex B countries eliminate their emissions. However, moderate commitments of DCs (when they reach sufficient economic development), make the 2 °C scenario feasible. Technology Treansfer Protocols combined with binding emission reduction targets thus provide a mechanism to reduce climate change damages, and may generate significant secondary benefits. For example, the reduced tax-subsidy scenario (RTS20) has 77% to 40% chances to remain below 2 °C of warming and an undiscounted cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) cost of 0.75% relative to baseline (not accounting for the benefits of avoided damages).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.01.063

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A new climate change treaty must address three current gaps: the absence of emissions targets extending far into the future; the absence of participation by the United States, China, and other developing countries; and the absence of reasons to expect compliance. Moreover, to be politically acceptable, a post-Kyoto treaty must recognize certain constraints regarding country-by-country economic costs. This article presents a framework for assigning quantitative emissions allocations across countries, one budget period at a time, through a two-stage plan: (a) China and other developing countries accept targets at business-as-usual (BAU) levels in the coming budget period, and, during the same period, the United States agrees to cuts below BAU; (b) all countries are asked to make further cuts in the future in accordance with a formula that includes a Progressive Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a Gradual Equalization Factor. An earlier proposal (Frankel 2009) for specific parameter values in the formulas achieved the environmental goal that carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations plateau at 500 ppm by 2100. It met our political constraints by keeping every country’s economic cost below thresholds of Y = 1 percent of income in Present Discounted Value, and X = 5 percent of income in the worst period. The framework proposed in this article attains a stricter concentration goal of 460 ppm CO2 but only by loosening the political constraints.

doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/reep/rer022

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Clean technology is central to climate cooperation. How can countries promote the development and adoption of new clean technologies? In this article, I examine the strategic benefits of establishing an international technology fund. A game-theoretic analysis shows that a technology fund with a dual mandate of rewarding technology development and subsidizing subsequent adoption can contribute to climate cooperation. Interestingly, a technology fund can also reduce North-South distributional conflict. My institutional analysis reveals two particularly important issues in the design of a technology fund: credible commitment to funding rules and the use of a balanced burden sharing rule. Based on these observations, I propose that a technology fund could be established within the institutional framework of the World Bank.

doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.08.007

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